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[L. A. No. 19456. In Bank. Apr. 2, 1946.J

CONSOLIDATED VULTEE AIRCRAFT COlWORATION
(a Corporation), Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF Al\IERICA LOCAL 904,
Defendant and AppelJant.
[lJ Appeal-Moot Questions.-A court will not continue with the
I"e\·iew of an arbitration award in proceedings for its confirmaf iOIl or vacation if the award does not affect the present relatiolls of the parties, and an appeal from a judgment confirming
such award will be dismissed where an amendment of a contract to which the award relates ha!' become inoperative with
the termination of the contract.
[2] Arbitra.tion-Award-Necessity for Confirmation by Court.An employer is under no enforceable duty to agree to the
amendment of a labor contract to which an arbitration award
relates where the order of the superior court purporting to
confirm the award is in effect an order vacating the award.
[8] Appeal-Moot Questions.-An appeal is prevented from becoming moot only if the rights of the parties are directly affected by its determination, and the possibility that a labor
union, appealing from a judgment purporting to confirm an
arbitration award, would greatly improve its bargaining position should there be a determination that the award was valid,

[1] See 2 Cal.Jur. 749; 1 Cal.Jur.l0-Yr. Supp. 465.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3] Appeal and Error, § 18; [2] Arbitration, § 5a.
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dol's nol COI\.>,tilnt.p sueh nn,illllll('(lint(' interest in the litigation
liS wOlllil 1"!''1llil"(' a jl1(1.:!'m<'nt nn t.he merits ~I here a new
IIgreelll('nt has RllJler~(l('(l the agrl'l'ment that was to be
IlIlH'Ilflrcl lln(ll'l" th!' award.

Al'I'EAl~8 from jUdglllClltR of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County corifirmill~ an award of arbitrators,
and from an order to correct and amrlld a jl:dgmcnt. llelJl'Y
M. Willis, Judge. Appeals dismissed .

.

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, J. Stuart Keary and Ira C.
Powers for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Katz, Gallagher & Margolis, Milton S. Tyre and Ben
Margolis for Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, J .-On June 1, 1942, United Automobile Aircraft and Agricultural Implement 'Vorkers of America Local
904, hereinafter referred to as the union, and Consolidated
Vultee Aircraft Corporation, hereinafter referred to as the
company, entered into a collective bargaining agreement,
which was to remain in effect "until June 1, 1943, or until
ninety (90) days after the present war in which this country
is engaged is terminated, whichever is longer, and shall thereafter automatically renew itself in its entirety from year to
year for a period of one (1) year." On February 19, 1945,
the parties entered into a new collective bargaining agreement
superseding the former one. They also entered into a separate agreement providing that the agreement of February
19. 1945, shall not prejudice the claims of either party on
the present appeal and shall not affect the parties' contentions "concerning the advisability ot including therein appropriate provisions on maintenance of membership and
check-off."
The present litigation arose under the first agreement,
which provided that "if mutual consent for amending Agreement is not given, the desirability of amendment may be referred to the grievance procedure." Grievances were to be submitted to the plant grievance committee of the union and the
company's labor relations committee. If the company and
union representatives could not agree, they could invoke the
arbitration procedure provided for in the agreement. The
union initiated grievance proceedings to obtain an amendment
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adding provisions 1'0" '{lUllltcll:lIlCe of membership and checkoff of union dues ~1(1 initiation fees. Ilu\'illg failed in the
g-I'ic\"unce p"oecllure tosecurc the company's COlJScnt to sl1ell
all amendmcnt, the unioll ill\"ol;cd the arbitration procedul'e
to hU\'e the following all)CJHl!~cllt added to the contra('t: "In
order to secure the increased production whieh will "esult
frolll gl'eatel' harlllollY be~!cen workers and employers and
in the interest of increased cooperation between union and
manugement, which cannot exist without a sta bJe and responsible union, the parties hereto agree as follows: All emplo~'ees who, 15 days after the date of this amendment to the
contract are members of the union in good standing in accOl'dance with the constitution and bylaws of the union and
those employees who may thereafter become members shall,
during the life of the agreement as a condition of employment, remain members of the Union in good standing. The
Company for said employees shall deduct from the first pay
of each month the union dues for the preceding month of
one dollar ($1.00) and promptly remit the same to the secretary-treasurer of the Local Union. The initiation fee of
the Union of three dollars ($3.00) shall be deducted b~' the.
Company and remit.ted to the secretary-treasurer of the Local
Union in the same manner as dues collection. The Union
shall promptly furnish to the Company a notarized list of
members in good standing 15 da~·s after the date of the
amendment to the contract. If any employee named on that
list asserts that he withdrew from membership' in the Union
prior to that date and any dispute arises the assertion or
dispute shall be adjudicated in aecordance with the arbitration procedure of this agreement and the decision of the
arbiter shall be final and binding upon the Union, the Employer and the employees."
The permanent arbitrator elected by the parties under the
contract made an award determining that the parties should
add the proposed amencl.ment to their contract. The compan~' filed a motion in the superior court under sections 1288,
1200 of the Code of Civil Procedure to vacate the award on
the ground that the arbitrator impaired the exclusive right
retained by the company to hire and discharge its employees
nnd exceeded his jurisdiction in violation of the provision
in the agreement that the arbitrator "shall not have jurisdiction to arbitrate provisions of a new agreement or to arbi·
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trate away, in whore or in part, any provisions of this Agreement." The union filed a cross-motion for confirmation of
the award under sections 1287 and 129] of the Code of' Civil
Procedure. The court made 'an order confirming the award.
but a month later corrected its order nu.nc pro tunc, stating
"that the foregoing amendment does not and shall not be
construed to impose any obligation upon the employer to
discharge any employee.JDr failure to maintain in good standing his membership in the union according to the Constitution
and By-laws of the Union and does not impair t.he exclusi\'e
right t.o hire and discharge emR,loyees given by Article I,
Section 6, of the contract to which the amendment relates."
The order of the court must be read with this correction. By
correcting its order. the court determined that it had jurisdiction to make the correction. The corrected order became
the court's disposition of the case and was subject to the
right of the parties to appeal. The decision of the court was
corrected, nominally a confirmation of the award, was actually a cancellation thereof, for the award made maintenance
of membership in the union "a condition of employment" for
all employees who were or became union members after the
expiration of the 15 days' escape period specified in the
award. The order must be read as also denying confirmation
to the check-off proYision, for it appears from the arbitration
proceedings that the check-off of initiat.ion fees and union
dues was applied for and allowed only as an incident to the
maintenance of membership provision in order to prevent
forfeiture of employment b~' nonpayment of union fees and
dues. Both parties appeal.
[1] It is contended that the appeals have become moot
because the new agreement has superseded the agreement that
was to be amended under the award. An amendment that
would become inoperative with the termination of a contract
obviously cannot take effect after such termination. Since
the amendment to which the award relates has become obsolete, a confirmation of the award would be meaningless. A
court will not continue with the review of an arbitration
award in proceedings for its confirmation or vacation, if the
award does not affect the present relations of the parties, just
as it will not continue with the review of a decision by a
court if t1l(' \lr('i~jf)n r:mllot 1)(' (,lJfOI'C{,(l. .As the rnited Stat{'~
Supremc l\nut t.lcclurct.l in 111ills Y. Green. 159 U.S. 651, GjJ
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duty of this court, as of
every other judicial tribunal, ~ to decide actual controversies
by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to
give opinions upon Il!oor, quest ions or abstract propositions,
or to declare principles 'or rules of law.. which cannot affect
the matter in issue in~he cas(' br.fore it. It necessarily follows
that when, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower
court, and without any fault of the defendant, an eyent occurs which renders it impossible fol' thi~ court, if it should
decide the case in favor of plaintiff, to grant him any effectual
relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the appeal." (See California Pacific
etc. Co. v. California Mining & D. Syndicate, 17 Cal.App.2d
353, 355 [61 P.2d 1181]; General Petroleum Corp. of California v. Beilby, 213 Cal. 601 [2 P.2d 797]; Armstrong v.
Sacramento Valley Realty Co., 179 Cal. 648, 651 [178 P.
516]; Estate of McSwain, 176 Cal. 287, 288 [168 P. 117];
Hindman v. Owl Drug Co., 4 Cal.2d 451, 456 [50 P.2d 438];
Fletcher v. Dexter, 60 Cal.App.2d 275 [140 P.2d 697]; see
2 Cal.Jur. 749; 1 Cal.Jur. 10-Yr. Supp. 465.)
[2] The union contends, however, that it would be entitled to recover damages from the company if the award
were confirmed. In this regard the union asserts that subsequent to the award and before the new contract was made.
thousands of union members failed to pay their dues and
thereby became delinquent in their membership; that such
delinquencies would not have occurred had the maintenance
of membership clause been in effect; and that therefore th-:
company, by opposing the award in the confirmation proceedings, was responsible for the union's loss of union dues.
The union, however, could claim damages only if the company was guilty of a breach of contract. There was no such
breach, for the company was under no duty to agree to the
amendment of the contract in the absence of a confirmation
of the award. Under the pertinent provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure an award becomes enforceable only if it
is confirmed by the superior court (§ 1287). Upon such confirmation it is made enforceable b~' the entry of a judgment
(§ 1291) . which "has the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and is subject to all provisions of law relating to,
a judgment in an action; and .. , may be enforced, as if it
has been rendered in an action in the court in which it is
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entered." (§ 1292.) III th(> pr('sent case, ~ince th(> compa.ny
had made a motion to '::1catc th(> award, no order of confirmation and no ju(l~n'\"'ent fOJ" the enforcement of the award
could be entered until the motion to vacat(' the award wa8
disposed of. (§§ 1287.: ]288.) Since the ordel that the trial
court entered bef~e the n~w contract was made was in
effect an order vacating the award, the company was under
no enforceable duty to agree to the amendment.
The duty that would have been imposed upon the company by the award had it lYccome enforceable did not exist
independently of the award. The award was not made to
determine existing contract rights; its purpose was to create
contract rights that had not previously existed and therefore
could not be enforced or violated hefore the award became enforceable. There is a clear distinction between such an award
and an award determining that existing contract rights have
been violated. "Arbitration is frequentl~' used as a method
in the settlement of labor disputes. Occasionally it is used
to interpret the terms of an existing contract. but more often
it is utilized for the purpose of making a contract, or creating
or perfecting the relation of employer and employee between
the respective parties. Arbitration8 concerning wage disputes
and union recognition are of this type. They are not judicial
in their nature but are rather a part of the collective bargaining process. These arbitrations are like commercial arbitrations in name alone." (6 Williston, Contracts, rev. ed.,
§ 1930. ) The present award i8 also clearly distinguishable
from an award prescribing an increase in wages as of a specified date. If such an award is confirmed after the date specified for the commencement of the wage increase, it follows
from the terms of the award that back-pay can be collected
thereunder after its confirmation. Such back-pay represents,
not the payment of damage8 for \'iolation of a contract, but
the performance of an obligation created by the award.
[3] The union also contends that a determination that
the award was valid and should have been confirmed would
greatly improve its bargaining position. In this respect it
refers to the provision in the present collective bargaining
agreement that the agreement will not affect the contentions
of the parties as to the adyisahility of including therein provisions on maintenance of membership and check-off. It contends that "The very existence of maintenance of member-
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ship and check-off clauses in the recently expircd contl'nf't,
would provide a greater arguil1~ point for the lmion in demanding the same in its J:>resent HJ·Hi-l!"l4G rOlltl'!l('t and in
all future contracts . . . . It is well known alllon~ tliose who
participate actively in ~]Jeetiye bar!!"aining ncgotiatiollS thnt
the presence or absence of a partirular clanse in a re('enlly
expired contract oft~ i'l the most influential fact or in dct Cl"mining the presence or absence M the !-lame provision in the
next following contract." If present rights of the union 01'
the company depended on the"validity of the award, the appeals would not be moot even though the amendment could
not be put into effect. Thus, if the present agl'eement provided that maintenance of membership and cbeck-off provisions should be inserted therein if the award validly provided
such amendment of the former agreement, the determination
of its validity would involve present contract rights of the
parties and would therefore not be an abstract decision. The
union does not claim, however, that its rights under the new
contract depend upon the determination of the present litigation. ,It contends merely that its chances to improve its
present contract would be increased if it were determined
that the award should have been confirmed. An appeal is
prevented from becoming moot only if the rights of the parties
are directly affected by its determination. Their interest must
be "immediate ..• and not a remote consequence of the
judgment." (Hamilton Trust Co. v. Cornucopia Mines Co.,
223 F. 494, 499 [139 C.C.A. 42]; California Pac. etc. Co. v.
California Mining &7 D. Syndicate, supra, 17 CaLApp.2d 353,
354.) The possibility that the union might be able to utilize
a favorable decision on its present appeal for the creation
of future contract rights does not constitute such an immediate interest in the present litigation as is required for proceeding therewith to a judgment on the merits.
The questions presented on these appeals having become
moot, the appeals are dismissed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
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